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INTRODUCTION 
In his seminal work, TORT LAW IN AMERICA, Ted White describes tort 
law as vacillating between a focus that is admonitory, emphasizing conduct 
that is wrongful, and compensatory, providing the injured with resources to 
allay their injuries.1  We are currently in an admonitory period, and, 
according to White, we have been since around 1980.2  Moreover, we are not 
at the point that the pendulum starts to swing back to a more compensatory 
understanding of tort law.  We are, however, at a moment of flux in tort 
theory. 
During this recent period, the dominant understanding of admonition 
has been instrumental: Liability is imposed in order to efficiently deter 
accidents.3  Tort law is used as a means to the end of promoting safety.  That 
 
© 2021 Christopher J. Robinette. 
*Professor of Law, Widener University Commonwealth Law School.  B.A., College of William & 
Mary, 1993; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1996.  Thanks to Don Gifford, Greg 
Keating, and Sheila Scheuerman for their helpful comments.  For excellent research assistance, I 
thank Shannon Costa, Carolyn Dreer, Thomas Kutz, and Timothy Long.  I dedicate this piece to 
Oscar Gray in appreciation for the opportunity to work on the treatise to which he devoted his life. 
 1. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY  291 (2003). 
 2. Id. at 244–48. 
 3. This goal is associated with a law-and-economics approach to tort law, which has been 
described as “the dominant theory of torts.  It is the theory to meet and beat.”  PHILOSOPHY AND 
THE LAW OF TORTS 5 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).  But see Michael D. Green, 
Negligence=Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1643 (1997) (“Negligence no 
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understanding of admonition is increasingly challenged by an alternative: 
Tort law provides vindication to those civilly wronged by others.4  In other 
words, tort law is not simply about providing incentives to behave better—it 
is about the ability to rectify wrongs, placed in the hands of those who 
suffered them.  Although the latter is a preferable admonitory understanding, 
this moment of flux is an excellent opportunity to seek a still-better 
alternative.  Instead of continuing to vacillate between opposing theories, we 
should attempt to blend admonition and compensation.  My approach 
incorporates Gregory Keating’s focus on distributive justice,5 as well as 
access-to-justice concerns.6  The gist of the concept is a tort law that is 
generally wrongs-based, while incorporating a form of compensatory 
pressure-release valve or bypass. 
The goal of this Article is to advocate for this synthesis as a general 
approach to tort theory.  Incorporating compensation into tort law would 
match the motivations of many parties in the tort system and help improve 
its administration.  I practiced tort law for seven years, usually representing 
plaintiffs.  Some of my clients were interested in vindication, but the majority 
were motivated by compensation, by which I mean they needed money to 
pay their medical bills and replace lost wages.  There is a problem, however, 
with sending both types of plaintiffs into the same tort system.  Tort law, 
particularly negligence, is uncertain, and that uncertainty leads to delay and 
transaction costs as lawyers and experts dispute liability and damages.7  For 
plaintiffs interested in vindication, perhaps the time needed to pay close 
attention to the facts and circumstances makes sense.  After all, determining 
whether one has been wronged is a serious inquiry.  Those features, however, 
are counterproductive to compensating the injured.  A system of tort law that 
is able to vindicate rights in proper cases, but also efficiently compensate 
harms in others, would be ideal.   
History both supports the need for a compensatory bypass in tort law 
and provides guidance as to the tradeoffs it would likely entail.8  The urge for 
compensation has shaped tort law going back over a century, regardless of 
whether it was in an admonitory or compensatory phase.  Compensation is a 
 
doubt entails a balancing of competing concerns, but those concerns often are not identical to what 
a rigorous economic efficiency standard would require.”). 
 4. A great deal of credit for this change belongs to John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky and their 
advocacy of civil recourse theory.  See, e.g., JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, 
RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020). 
 5. Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 
S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2000). 
 6. I thank John Goldberg for this characterization.  
 7. See infra Section I. 
 8. See infra Section II. 
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particularly powerful motivation during accident surges.  Tort history reveals 
a pattern of surges of accidents, and a common response to these surges: 
recovery becomes more swift and certain, but in smaller amounts.9  Both 
parties receive benefits in the compromise.  I discuss three examples: (1) 
workplace accidents, (2) automobile accidents, and (3) mass disasters.  It is 
foreseeable that injuries will continue to pressure tort law, and it would be 
wise to incorporate a mechanism to handle that pressure.  Moreover, a 
common response to the pressure of injuries is to compromise, exchanging 
ease of compensation for a decrease in its size.  Oscar Gray, himself, made 
this observation in the context of compensation systems: they generally 
involve lesser or no fault requirements and reduced damages.10  Facilitating 
such a tradeoff would correspond to the wishes of the parties in many cases 
and more efficiently provide both compensation and vindication. 
I. PARTIES’ MOTIVATIONS AND EFFICIENCY 
Despite tort theory’s current focus on admonition, many plaintiffs in the 
tort system are motivated by compensation.  In fact, I believe the majority of 
tort plaintiffs are primarily motivated not by vindication but by 
compensation—they need money to pay their bills.  I base this on my 
experience as a practitioner, primarily representing plaintiffs in personal 
injury cases.  Some of my clients were motivated by vindication; this was 
more likely to be true in intensely personal cases like false imprisonment and 
defamation.  Most of my clients, however, seemed to me primarily motivated 
by the pursuit of lost resources.  Unlike the common view of plaintiffs as gold 
diggers, my clients generally sued reluctantly and only when it became clear 
it was necessary to obtain compensation.11   
Although this is an anecdotal view,12 it is supported by objective data.  
Vindication is best achieved with a public acknowledgment of the claimant’s 
victory (i.e., a jury verdict in the claimant’s favor).  But if vindication alone 
motivated plaintiffs, one would imagine a world in which a large number of 
cases were tried to verdict.  In reality, the opposite is true: the vast majority 
 
 9. See infra Section II. 
 10. Oscar S. Gray, Future Prospects for Compensation Systems Introduction, 52 MD. L. REV. 
893, 894 (1993). 
 11. Stella Liebeck of the McDonald’s coffee spill case is an example of this attitude.  Liebeck 
was awarded $160,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7 million in punitive damages, which were 
reduced by the trial judge to $480,000.  Before filing suit, or even consulting a lawyer, Liebeck 
requested that McDonald’s pay her medical bills, approximately $11,000, to resolve the injury.  
Kevin G. Cain, And Now, the Rest of the Story…About the McDonald’s Coffee Lawsuit, 45 HOUS. 
LAW. 25, 26, 29 (2007).  I thank Greg Keating for this point.   
 12. I have attempted, unsuccessfully, to design a study that would provide more systematic data 
on why plaintiffs bring tort claims.  It is important, and I hope to try again soon. 
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of tort cases settle.13  Marc Galanter finds approximately 98% of civil cases 
are resolved before trial.14  There is similar data concerning automobile 
accidents—a majority of all tort claims and three-quarters of all payouts15—
which are resolved before trial over 97% of the time.16  Many of these 
settlements require plaintiffs to acknowledge a statement by the defendant 
denying wrongdoing17 and include confidentiality provisions.18  Other 
factors, such as general peace and compensation, which can be especially 
pressing for some, must then motivate many claimants. 
As noted, there is no large-scale study on why tort plaintiffs file claims, 
but a few studies have been conducted specific to medical malpractice.  These 
studies have found several non-compensatory reasons plaintiffs file suit.  
Three reasons are particularly potent: “to get information about and 
understand their injury and the circumstances surrounding it, to determine 
accountability, and to prevent future injuries.”19  Yet one study of Florida 
medical malpractice plaintiffs asked the participants: “If you had had the 
opportunity of receiving guaranteed compensation for medical expenses and 
lost income caused by the medical injury, but no compensation for pain and 
suffering, inconvenience, or other non-economic losses, would you have 
taken that opportunity?”20  This question gets directly at the primacy of 
compensation as a motivation for plaintiffs.  Over thirty percent of the 
 
 13. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 465 (2004). 
 14. Id.  
 15. JAMES M. ANDERSON, PAUL HEATON & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, RAND INST. FOR CIV. 
JUST., THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 1 
(2010). 
 16. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1495 
(2009). 
 17. Admitting fault is an “extraordinary step.”  Associated Press, Pa. Hospital Admits Fault in 
Infection That Killed Preemies, Settles Lawsuit, PENNLIVE PATRIOT NEWS (July 15, 2020), 
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/07/pa-hospital-admits-fault-in-infection-that-killed-
preemies-settles-lawsuit.html (statement of plaintiffs’ attorney Matt Casey) (stating that an 
admission of fault was “something he said he’s never before seen in a civil settlement in over two 
decades of medical malpractice work”). 
 18. See George L. Blum, Nondisclosure or Confidentiality Agreements in Cases Involving 
Products Liability, 40 A.L.R 7th Art. 2, §2 (2019) (“[M]ost defendants in mass tort cases involving 
products liability, drugs, or toxic substances will not settle without a secrecy agreement.”); Blanca 
Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About Settlement in an 
Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 690 (2001) (“[C]onfidential settlements most likely 
account for a large proportion of all settlements.”); Minna J. Kotkin, Reconsidering Confidential 
Settlements in the #MeToo Era, 54 U.S.F. L. REV. 517, 525 (2020) (explaining that in employment 
discrimination cases, estimates of the number of cases settled secretly range from 60% to 78%). 
 19. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t Know About the Role of Apologies in 
Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2005). 
 20. Allen W. Imershein & Alan H. Brents, The Impact of Large Medical Malpractice Awards 
on Malpractice Awardees, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 33, 40 (1992). 
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subjects answered in the affirmative.21  Even in an area of tort law that 
involves a personal relationship between the parties and in which many 
patients feel a sense of betrayal by their physician,22 this study indicates more 
than three out of every ten plaintiffs would accept economic loss alone to 
resolve a claim. 
Thus, there is a portion of claimants in the tort system for whom 
compensation is the primary motivating factor.  Forcing these plaintiffs to 
use the same tort system inhabited by plaintiffs pursuing vindication is 
harmful to both types of plaintiffs.  Tort law—negligence especially—is 
uncertain; it is based on what a reasonable person would do, and is 
compounded by the vagueness of how to value pain and suffering.  Working 
within these uncertain standards is slow for lawyers and other experts, 
resulting in delay and transaction costs.  If one is seeking vindication—
righting a wrong—the painstaking attention to detail may be worth it.  Not so 
for those merely seeking compensation.  For those seeking payment for 
medical bills and the replacement of lost wages, the further loss of time and 
money are just wasteful.  Moreover, their presence in the tort system 
exacerbates the problems of delay and transaction costs for those seeking 
vindication. 
When plaintiffs are motivated by compensation, their needs are often 
urgent.23  They have creditors waiting to receive money for medical bills, or 
for other bills that could not be paid due to their inability to work.  Delay is 
so detrimental to plaintiffs that one leading scholar, writing decades ago, 
noted, “The speeding up of settlements . . . would do more to relieve the 
distress of injury victims than any other conceivable change in tort law 
administration.”24  If “justice delayed is justice denied,” justice is denied 
often in tort law. 
A study by the prestigious Harvard School of Public Health found that 
the average medical malpractice case takes five years from the time of the 
injury to resolution, and one in three cases lasts six years or longer.25  This is 
a long time for a plaintiff to wait to recover lost funds, but defendants suffer, 
too.  Defendants such as physicians and manufacturers are distracted from 
their primary work; prolonged litigation reduces the amount of time available 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 41.  
 23. An earlier version of this argument is found in JEFFREY O’CONNELL & CHRISTOPHER J. 
ROBINETTE, A RECIPE FOR BALANCED TORT REFORM 29–49 (2008). 
 24. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 826 (2011) 
(quoting Alfred F. Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REV. 279, 
315 (1964)). 
 25. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2031 (2006). 
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for more productive efforts.26  The Harvard School of Public Health authors 
stated, “These are long periods for plaintiffs to await decisions about 
compensation and for defendants to endure the uncertainty, acrimony, and 
time away from patient care that litigation entails.”27  In addition to creating 
problems for the parties to the tort cases in question, delay clogs the dockets 
of the judicial system, forcing parties in other disputes to wait until earlier 
cases are resolved. 
Delay is problematic beyond complex malpractice cases.  A recent study 
examined all publicly recorded foodborne illness settlements and verdicts in 
the United States between 2000 and 2011.28  From the time of the incident 
until the time of resolution, the average length of resolution was 3.35 years; 
one case took fourteen years to resolve.29  Cases going to trial averaged 3.66 
years before a final verdict; cases that settled were somewhat faster, at 2.93 
years, although one settlement took ten years to complete.30 
Although problematic by itself, delay is associated with the further 
difficulty of transaction costs.  As cases grind on, lawyers and experts for 
both sides are busy working and billing.  Lawyers representing plaintiffs 
typically charge a contingency fee of 33%, and sometimes up to 50%, of 
gross recovery.31  Defendants or their insurers pay lawyers either an hourly 
rate or a flat fee, regardless of whether they win or lose.  In addition to 
lawyers, parties in many types of tort cases must pay experts.  In the early 
1990s, a products liability litigation guide included multiple examples of a 
plaintiff’s advanced expenses totaling several hundred thousand dollars.32  In 
2002, Gary Schwartz estimated that the average plaintiff’s medical 
malpractice expenses (not including attorneys’ fees) were approximately 
$50,000 per case.33 
 
 26. In 2006, I spoke to an orthopedic surgeon who told me that he had been sued twice in his 
career.  Both cases lasted over ten years, and both cases resulted in him being dismissed from the 
suit. 
 27. Studdert et al., supra note 25, at 2031. 
 28. Alexia Brunet Marks, Check Please: Using Legal Liability to Inform Food Safety 
Regulation, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 723, 723–24 (2013).   
 29. Id. at 768. 
 30. Id.; see also Jeffrey O’Connell & Craig A. Stanton, Justice Delayed Is . . . Delay Ignored: 
The Indifference of Judges and Law Professors to Legal Lassitude, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 489–
90, 494 (1999) (describing a study conducted in four leading Torts casebooks which revealed fifty-
one cases that went to trial, with the average time from incident until appellate decision being 6.94 
years; in almost half the cases, the judges ordered a remand or a new trial). 
 31. Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data 
and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 657 (2003). 
 32. 3 JOHN F. VARGO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE § 42.065a, at 42, 56.15–.16 
(Matthew Bender ed., 1992). 
 33. Gary T. Schwartz, Empiricism and Tort Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2002). 
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Transaction costs ultimately reduce the amount of money reaching the 
plaintiff as compensation.  In 2018, a study conducted by the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform estimated that of every dollar 
spent in the tort system, only fifty-seven cents go towards compensating 
plaintiffs for their injuries.34  The remaining money was consumed in “cost[s] 
of litigation, insurance expenses, and risk transfer costs.”35  Although the 
U.S. Chamber pursues a tort reform agenda, the percentages in its study 
estimate tort law to be more efficient than many other sources of data, going 
back decades.  For example, the Harvard School of Public Health study 
referenced earlier found that 54% of the money expended in the medical 
malpractice cases in its sample was spent on transaction costs, leaving 
plaintiffs only 46%.36  Other studies have found the percentage of money 
reaching plaintiffs as compensation in medical malpractice cases is even 
lower, at 40%.37  Transaction costs in products liability cases are similar, with 
studies finding the percentage of money reaching plaintiffs in the low forty-
percent range.38 
Transaction costs have bedeviled tort law for decades.  A major study 
in the 1980s concluded that tort law’s administrative costs were 54% of net 
plaintiff benefits.39  There was an efficiency difference within torts, however: 
“The plaintiffs’ net compensation as a percentage of the total expenditures 
was 52 percent for auto torts and 43 percent for all other torts.”40  Joanna 
 
 34. PAUL HINTON, DAVID MCKNIGHT & LAWRENCE POWELL, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR 
LEGAL REFORM, COSTS AND COMPENSATION OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM 24 (2018), 
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/Tort_costs_paper_FINAL_WEB.pdf. 
 35. Id. at 26.  Taking fault out of the process is not a panacea; parties still fight over causation 
and other things.  It can, however, reduce transaction costs substantially.  Workers’ compensation’s 
transaction costs are approximately 21%, less than half those of tort law.  Nora Freeman Engstrom, 
Exit, Adversarialism, and the Stubborn Persistence of Tort, 6 J. TORT L. 75, 82–83 (2013). 
 36. Studdert et al., supra note 25, at 2031. 
 37. Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic Activity: An Empirical Analysis of 
Tort Reform’s Impact on Businesses, Employment, and Production, 66 VAND. L. REV. 257, 286 
n.159 (2013) (first citing PETER W. HUBER, THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 151 
(1988) (concluding that plaintiffs receive forty cents of every dollar paid by defendants in medical 
malpractice cases); and then citing Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, in 1B 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1339, 1369 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 
2000) (“concluding that plaintiffs receive forty cents of every dollar paid by defendants in medical 
malpractice cases”)“”).  
 38. Shepherd, supra note 37, at 286 n.159 (first citing STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. 
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 104 (2005) (“concluding that plaintiffs receive forty-
two cents of every dollar paid by defendants in asbestos cases”); and then citing HUBER, supra note 
37, at 151 (“concluding that plaintiffs receive forty cents of every dollar paid by defendants in 
products liability cases”)). 
 39. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS AND 
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 70 (1986). 
 40. Id. 
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Shepherd summarizes tort law’s transaction costs problem: “Hence, for every 
dollar defendants pay to compensate victims, an additional dollar and change 
is spent on legal and administrative expenses.  Moreover, as legal fees and 
litigation delays continue to increase, this inefficiency will only worsen.”41 
The problems of delay and transaction costs can be traced to tort law’s 
overwhelming uncertainty.  All law is potentially subject to factual 
uncertainty, but beyond that “it is not always clear how a tort rule applies to 
the (undisputed) facts.”42  Unfortunately, this is true in a double sense.  Robert 
Rabin notes that accident law “is open-textured both in the liability 
determination of fault and the damages determination of noneconomic 
harm.”43  In other words, the standard for determining whether someone is 
liable is vague, and once that decision is made, determining how much they 
owe in damages is also vague. 
In strict products liability, the liability issue is whether a product is 
defective.  A product may have one of three types of defect: manufacturing, 
design, or warning.44  Design and warning claims are by far the most common 
and consequential products liability cases.45  Yet David Owen describes 
design and warning notions as covered in “shrouds of mist . . . so vague that 
they are often effectively meaningless.”46  He continues, “One indeed may 
ask whether ‘law’ itself exists in such terrain, or whether ‘lawless’ is the 
better word to describe the prevailing ‘rule’ of random guilt.”47   
In terms of design defects, jurisdictions are not uniform, but the majority 
appears to follow the risk-utility test.48  Owen finds little comfort in the 
apparent consensus: 
First, there is no single clearly accepted view as to how the design defect 
balancing test should be described or formulated.  A related finding is that 
there is considerable variation in how the balancing test is formulated among 
the states, among decisions within the same state, and often even within the 
same judicial opinion.  Another finding is that courts today quite typically 
cobble together a variety of separate and often conflicting formulations of 
balancing tests borrowed, without analysis, from earlier opinions.  Further, 
 
 41. Shepherd, supra note 37, at 286–87. 
 42. Mark A. Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and Tort Reform, 60 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 539, 540 (2011).  
 43. Robert L. Rabin, The Pervasive Role of Uncertainty in Tort Law: Rights and Remedies, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 432 (2011). 
 44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD. LIABILITY § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).  
 45. Geistfeld, supra note 42, at 544. 
 46. David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of 
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (1982). 
 47. Id.   
 48. Geistfeld, supra note 42, at 547. 
  
2021] HARMONIZING WRONGS AND COMPENSATION 351 
 
many courts acknowledge that a variety of factors should be balanced but 
neither discriminate between the various factors nor explain how they should 
be balanced or otherwise interrelate.49 
The standard for warnings is no better.  The Reporters for the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, James Henderson and 
Aaron Twerski, state that the doctrine is “little more than an empty 
shell. . . . [as] such a tort is too lawless to be fair or useful.”50 
Determining liability in medical malpractice cases is equally difficult.  
There are a number of potentially liable defendants to sort through: 
physicians, nurses, hospitals, and manufacturers of equipment and 
pharmaceuticals.  Complicating matters further, a study by the Institute of 
Medicine found that adverse results in health care are not typically caused by 
the fault of a single individual, but instead by complex, multicausal, systemic 
interactions.51  Such a finding, however, is inconsistent with most medical 
malpractice litigation, in which plaintiffs’ lawyers focus on the fault of 
individuals.52   
Additionally, proving fault in malpractice cases, whether of an 
individual or a system, is often difficult because of the nature of the human 
body.  The body is made up of intricate, interlocking parts that require years 
of devoted study to properly understand.  Yet, we require lay people to 
distinguish adverse consequences due to fault from preexisting conditions 
that further develop during treatment.  And we require them to do so within 
the time constraints of a trial often taking less than a week.  Moreover, the 
education process provided to jurors often includes conflicting and confusing 
technical expert testimony regarding the defendant’s or defendants’ 
negligence. 
Despite these difficulties, the results of medical malpractice litigation 
do not appear to be arbitrary; data suggest that there is a correlation between 
fault and liability.53  For example, the Harvard School of Public Health study 
determined the assessment of liability in the tort system was correct nearly 
 
 49. Id. (quoting David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 239, 242 (1997)). 
 50. Id. at 547–48 (quoting James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse 
in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 326 (1990)). 
 51. COMM’N ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: 
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999). 
 52. NEIL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
151–69 (2000). 
 53. Philip G. Peters, Jr., What We Know About Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1783, 
1785 (2007) (conducting a meta-study and concluding that settlement outcomes are driven by the 
strength of plaintiff’s case). 
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three-quarters of the time.54  That means, however, that despite taking an 
average of five years to resolve disputes, the tort system still gets it wrong 
over a quarter of the time.  Plaintiffs should be particularly concerned about 
incorrect outcomes.  According to a meta-study determining an error rate for 
and against each party, plaintiffs win approximately 10–20% of cases with 
weak evidence of negligence and 50% of cases with strong evidence 
thereof.55  Thus, plaintiffs win between 10% and 20% of cases they probably 
should lose, but lose half of the cases they probably should win. 
Uncertainty is not only a problem in determining liability in complex 
products and medical malpractice cases; it affects simple negligence cases as 
well.  Kenneth Abraham demonstrates the uncertainty of the “reasonable-
care-under-the-circumstances” standard by focusing on the job of the 
factfinder.56  The finder of fact must: (1) determine the empirical facts, such 
as what actions the defendant took; (2) determine what kind of care and how 
much of it was necessary under the particular circumstances, and (3) decide 
whether the defendant met the standard annunciated in step two.57  Abraham 
describes the second step as “an act of discretionary norm creation” specific 
to the facts and circumstances of this case.58  Moreover, Abraham notes that 
the norm creation in most negligence cases is “unbounded,” meaning the 
factfinder uses its “own general normative sense of the situation, informed 
by individual experience and by the evidence submitted by the parties.”59 
Abraham reveals the complexities of unbounded norm creation even in 
“the simplest of negligence cases,”60 a slip-and-fall arguably caused by 
negligent snow removal on a sidewalk.  What does reasonable care require?  
Abraham presents a list of potentially relevant factors: How much snow the 
defendant removed initially, whether the defendant inspected the premises 
later, the visibility of the ice, the number and steepness of the stairs, whether 
there was a railing, how long the area was in the sunlight during the day, and 
the snow removal customs in the neighborhood.61  Thus, the finder of fact 
faces numerous decision points: “[E]ach of these items of evidence is a 
potential predicate for the application of a norm to the facts of the case—for 
example, that a homeowner should remove all but the tiniest bits of snow 
 
 54. Studdert et al., supra note 25, at 2028. 
 55. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1464 (2007). 
 56. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1190–91 
(2001). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 1191. 
 59. Id. at 1190. 
 60. Id. at 1193. 
 61. Id.  
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from steps, [or] that subsequent inspection is (or is not) necessary.”62  Except 
in the unlikely event that any of the precautions are mandated by statute or 
ordinance, “the failure of the defendant to employ the precaution is simply 
an optional basis for the negligence decision by the finder of fact [who] . . . is 
simply directed to weigh all the evidence in deciding whether the defendant 
was or was not negligent.”63   
If, as seen, “[t]he standard of reasonable care is notoriously vague,”64 
the standard for measuring pain-and-suffering damages is even worse.  Take 
the California jury instructions as an example.  In California, for 
“Noneconomic Damage[s],” the factfinder is told: “No fixed standard exists 
for deciding the amount of these noneconomic damages.”65  The factfinder is 
also warned: “You must use your judgment to decide a reasonable amount 
based on the evidence and your common sense.”66 
Stating that pain and suffering is vague is merely to paraphrase the jury 
instruction: “No fixed standard exists for deciding the amount of these 
noneconomic damages.”67  Moreover the use of the words “judgment,” 
“reasonable,” and “common sense” in a single sentence is a warning of 
intense subjectivity.68  Such vagueness creates a number of problems.  One 
is “a lack of ‘horizontal equity.”69  Juries award very different amounts of 
money for similar injuries, creating a large amount of variation within an 
injury category.70  Even worse than the seeming randomness of such a 
distribution is the truth that these decisions are often influenced by factors 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Geistfeld, supra note 42, at 547.  Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has limited the awards of punitive damages based on the Due Process Clause.  See, 
e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“[F]ew awards 
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, 
will satisfy due process”); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–85 (1996) 
(setting three guideposts to determine if punitive damage awards satisfy due process:  (1) the degree 
of reprehensibility of the conduct; (2) the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages; and 
(3) sanctions for similar misconduct); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991) 
(holding that the Due Process Clause applies to punitive damages awards).  The Court’s limits are 
based on certain constitutional concerns: arbitrary deprivation of one’s property, fair notice of the 
precise conduct to be avoided, and poor decision-making by judges or juries.  State Farm, 538 U.S. 
at 417–18.  Geistfeld is so concerned about tort law’s vagueness, he maintains that basic tort awards 
implicate these concerns to the same extent as punitive damages.  Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional 
Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1099–100 (2005). 
 65. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3905A (2017). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Geistfeld, supra note 64, at 1107. 
 70. Id.  
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such as race, gender, and socioeconomic status.71  Such factors carry more 
weight when the standard is vague. 
For present purposes, the problem with the vagueness of pain and 
suffering damages is that it exacerbates the problem of vagueness in the 
standard for liability.  Measuring pain and suffering causes tremendous 
administrative costs.72  Litigation is increased because the double 
vagueness—is the defendant liable and how much should they pay if they 
are—allows the parties’ evaluations of the claim to substantially diverge.73  
Divergences in expectations impede settlement, both reducing its likelihood 
and increasing the time and money needed to reach accord.74 
Again, if a plaintiff is primarily motivated to right a wrong, the 
reasonable person standard can allow for a robust examination of the facts 
and circumstances.  The delay and transaction costs involved are an 
unfortunate byproduct, but may, perhaps, be justified by the search for truth.75  
If, however, a plaintiff simply wants to replace lost income, the uncertainty, 
delay, and transaction costs are intolerable.  They postpone and diminish 
what can be urgently needed funds.  A compensatory alternative, as history 
demonstrates, could have advantages for both plaintiffs and defendants. 
 
 71. Id. at 1107–08. 
 72. Jeffrey O’Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Offers as a Simple, if Second-
Best, Alternative to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858, 871 (1999). 
 73. See 2 A.L.I. REPORTERS’ STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 
202 (1991); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, The Vicissitudes of Tort: A Response to Professors 
Rabin, Sebok & Zipursky, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 695, 696 (2011) (emphasizing that the certainty of 
rules can operate in a “pro-liability direction”). 
 74. P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION, AND THE LAW 216 (3d ed. 1980); Joseph H. 
King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 
163, 196–97 (2004); O’Connell & Eaton, supra note 72, at 871. 
 For an extreme example, involving punitive damages, of tort law’s transaction costs and delay, 
consider the Exxon Valdez case over an oil spill off the coast of Alaska.  Even though negligence 
was not an issue, and the captain was admittedly drunk, the case lasted decades.  Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 477 (2008).  The accident occurred on the evening of March 24, 1989, 
and the Supreme Court rendered an opinion on the case on June 25, 2008, vacating a Ninth Circuit 
opinion and remanding.  Id. at 476, 515.  The Ninth Circuit made an award and remanded the case 
to the district court for entry of final judgment on June 15, 2009.  Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 568 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009).  In 1994, the jury handed down the punitive damages 
verdict and lead plaintiffs’ counsel hugged his three-year-old son.  Richard Lempert, Low 
Probability/High Consequence Events: Dilemmas of Damage Compensation, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 
357, 368–69 (2009).  An Exxon lawyer stated: “He’ll be in college before you get any of that 
money.”  Id. at 369 (quoting Robert E. Jenkins & Jill W. Kastner, Comment, Running Aground in 
a Sea of Complex Litigation: A Case Comment on the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 18 UCLA J. ENV’T 
L. & POL’Y 151, 192 (2000)).  Transaction costs were astronomical.  Id. at 368.  More than 1,000 
depositions were taken over 2,500 deposition days.  Id.  More than sixty law firms were involved.  
Id.  Ten years into the saga, it was estimated that Exxon had already spent $300 million on its 
defense.  Id.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys were to receive 22.4% of all funds eventually paid.  Id. 
 75. I suspect even vindication-oriented plaintiffs have problems with delay and transaction 
costs. 
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II. HISTORY 
Tort history can teach us several things about the desirability of a 
compensatory tort bypass.76  First, going back over a century, compensation 
has been a primary motivating factor for a substantial portion of plaintiffs.  
This is true in both admonitory and more compensatory phases.  In other 
words, the compensatory focus of a portion of current plaintiffs is not an 
anomaly and is unlikely to go away.  Instead, it should be accommodated.  
Second, compensatory urges are most obvious during surges of accidents.  
Accident surges heighten suffering, which needs to be alleviated, and also 
make compensatory solutions more possible due to the sheer number of 
accidents.  Third, the compensatory solutions that have arisen from accident 
surges demonstrate a pattern that can be useful in designing a compensatory 
bypass.   
The compensatory pressure of injuries repeatedly shapes the law.  Ever 
since the mid-nineteenth century—when negligence became a separate tort 
and the Industrial Revolution produced new ways to maim the human body—
tort law has experienced waves of injuries.  These waves, often spurred by 
technology,77 have occurred throughout the history of negligence law.  They 
amount to a mass of suffering human beings seeking compensation from a 
system focused on limiting liability.  The restrictions were particularly rigid 
during negligence’s first several decades.  There is no reason to think these 
waves of injuries will cease; thus, we should design tort law to absorb the 
pressures we know are coming. 
The law follows a pattern in response to the surges.  The law generally 
responds in a compensatory manner, such as by relaxing requirements to 
recover, either formally or informally, in exchange for a reduction in the 
amount of recovery.  In this compromise, both parties receive a benefit.  
Claimants gain more swift and certain access to (sometimes desperately) 
needed funds, while defendants (and their insurers) get smaller, more 
predictable payouts.  A compensatory mechanism making it easier for the 
parties to reach such a consistently favored result would improve tort law’s 
ability to achieve both compensation and vindication.  In this Section, I will 
discuss three examples of the pattern: workers’ compensation, automobile 
accidents, and mass disasters. 
 
 76. Portions of this section are adapted from Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil Recourse 
Theory Is Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. REV. 431 (2011). 
 77. See generally Donald G. Gifford, Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam 
Locomotives, Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident Compensation, 11 J. TORT L. 71 (2018). 
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A. Workers’ Compensation 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, there was no overarching tort of 
negligence.78  Negligence “emerged from the action of trespass on the case 
to take fairly clear shape in a few prescient judicial decisions and bits of 
commentary during the 1860s.”79  As negligence was emerging as a cause of 
action, its potential application exploded.  After the Civil War, 
industrialization and the growth of railroads dramatically increased the risk 
of injury, particularly to people in the workplace.80  John Witt describes the 
results: “Industrializing economies in the mid to late nineteenth century 
experienced an explosion of accident rates alongside the rapid development 
of new industries and more powerful machinery.”81  Industrialization’s injury 
rates surpassed even those of the war.82  Not only were there more injuries, 
those injuries were more severe.  As Donald Gifford states: “Locomotives, 
automobiles, and industrial machinery were more likely to result in crippling 
or even fatal injuries than were horses that threw a rider or the carelessness 
of coworkers using hand-tools.”83 
The 1850 census was the first to calculate national deaths from 
accidents.84  Between 1850 and 1880, “the [percentage] of deaths attributable 
to accident[s] among men aged ten to fifty increased by over 70 percent, 
[rising] from 7 percent to 12 percent.”85  The worst category of accidental 
injuries, by far, was workplace injuries, which “represent[ed] close to one-
third of all accidental deaths and . . . between one-half and two-thirds of all 
accidental injuries.”86  In 1890, railroad worker death rates were 314 per 
100,000 workers per year.87  Also in 1890, coal mining deaths “rang[ed] from 
215 deaths per 100,000 workers per year in bituminous coal mines to 300 
deaths per 100,000 workers per year in anthracite coal mines.”88  Trainmen, 
who “operat[ed] the coupling devices between [rail]cars, and brakemen, who 
operated the train’s handbrakes, died in work-related accidents at rates of 900 
 
 78. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 20 (2008). 
 79. Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1260 (2001). 
 80. ABRAHAM, supra note 78, at 26–27. 
 81. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE 
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 22 (2004). 
 82. Id. at 24 (quoting BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR & INDUS. OF N.J., THIRTEENTH ANNUAL 
REPORT 367 (1890)). 
 83. Gifford, supra note 77, at 124. 
 84. WITT, supra note 81, at 26 (citing J. D. B. DE BOW, U.S. CENSUS, MORTALITY STATISTICS 
OF THE SEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1850, at 17–20 (’1886)). 
 85. WITT, supra note 81, at 26. 
 86. Id. at 27. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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and 1,141 deaths per 100,000 workers per year, respectively.”89  In 
comparison to contemporary accident rates, those around the turn of the 
twentieth century were horrifying: A 1912 study of accidental deaths 
“estimated 82,500 deaths per year; [since then], the population of the United 
States has tripled, but the number of accidental deaths has increased by less 
than a quarter.”90  Witt summarizes: “Industrialization . . . had 
devised . . . new and unfamiliar mechanisms for inflicting harm on the human 
body.”91 
An increase in litigation accompanied the increase in the number and 
severity of accidental injuries.  Between 1870 and 1890, “the number of 
accident suits being litigated in New York City’s state courts grew almost 
eightfold; by 1910 the number had grown again” more than five times.92  
From 1870 until 1910, the percentage of tort cases in New York City’s trial 
courts’ contested caseload increased from 4.2 to 40.9%.93 
Tort law provided little relief for this mass of workplace injuries.  A 
leading Torts casebook states that tort provided “relatively few instances of 
compensation” for workplace incidents during this time.94  In his treatise, 
William Prosser presents various estimates placing the percentage of 
uncompensated workplace accidents between 70% and 87%.95  The 
limitations were both doctrinal and practical.  Doctrinally, many courts—at 
least in workplace accident cases—found that if the employer’s conduct was 
consistent with custom in the trade or business, the employer was not 
negligent as a matter of law.96  But the “most significant aspect of the 
doctrinal development”97 was the “unholy trinity”98 of defenses at the 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 26–27. 
 91. Id. at 28. 
 92. Id. at 59. 
 93. Id. (citing RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER:  INJURY AND LAW IN NEW 
YORK CITY, 1870–1910, at 20 tbl. 4 (1992)).  Gifford chronicles several factors that laid the 
groundwork for an increase in litigation at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
centuries.  Gifford, supra note 83, at 80–83.  They include: (1) the demise of the complicated writ 
pleading system, (2) the abolition of the witness disqualification rule (see generally Kenneth S. 
Abraham & G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Civil Trial and the Emergence of 
American Tort Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 468 (2017)), (3) the advent of the contingent fee, and (4) 
the advent of liability insurance.  Gifford, supra note 83, at 80–83. 
 94. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE, AND 
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1268 (13th ed. 2015). 
 95. G. Edward White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century: An Historical Perspective, 32 
VILL. L. REV. 1265, 1271 n.13 (1987) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 530 n.32 (4th ed. 1971)). 
 96. Gifford, supra note 77, at 95. 
 97. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 94, at 1267. 
 98. Id. 
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employer’s disposal: the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, and 
contributory negligence.   
The fellow servant rule, in most cases, prevented an employee from 
recovering from the employer if the injury was caused by the tortious conduct 
of another employee.99  Assumption of risk allowed an employer to escape 
liability even if it had been negligent if the employee accepted or continued 
in the employment after notice of such negligence.100  Finally, contributory 
negligence allowed an employer to escape liability despite its own negligence 
if the employee had been even slightly negligent himself.101  On a practical 
level, employees or their families were forced to find the courage to sue the 
hand that fed them.  Even if they managed to find that courage, “[l]ong, 
drawn-out litigation placed severe financial burdens upon workers.”102  In the 
end, “the realities of wealth and ineffectual representational institutions for 
workers”103 made the recovery of compensation rare. 
Attorney Crystal Eastman provided an illustration of tort’s 
compensatory limitations.  In her influential book Work-Accidents and the 
Law,104 Eastman reviewed 526 workplace deaths in Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania during parts of 1906 and 1907.105  Nearly all fatal workplace 
accidents, 523 of 526, killed men; almost half were married men, and 63% 
were the sole supporter of their family.106  In over half of those cases, “the 
widow and children were left by the employer to bear the entire income 
loss.”107  In only 30% of the cases did the family receive over $500, which 
was approximately a year’s income for the lowest paid of the deceased 
workers.108  
In advocating for a change to the common law tort system, Eastman 
“organize[d] work-accident debates around the image of the wounded 
family.”109  Highlighting her finding that 63% of the deceased men in her 
study were the sole supporter of their family, she stated, “[t]he people who 
 
 99. Gifford, supra note 83, at 95. 
 100. Id. at 96. 
 101. Id. at 96–97. 
 102. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 94, at 1267. 
 103. Id. at 1268. 
 104. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW (Paul Underwood Kellogg ed., 
1910). 
 105. Id. at 119. 
 106. Id. at 119–20. 
 107. Id. at 121. 
 108. Id. at 122.  The 30% figure is likely on the high side; Ms. Eastman made several liberal 
assumptions to reach it.  See id. at 121–22 (stating that this figure was reached by “assuming that 
all the unknown amounts were large and that all suits pending would be decided for the plaintiff”). 
 109. WITT, supra note 81, at 130. 
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perished were of those upon whom the world leans.”110  She described the 
lives of the widows and orphans left behind by workplace accidents, 
complete with poignant photographs.111  One widow and her children, for 
example, were forced to leave their home and move into the back rooms of a 
parent’s house.112  Other commissions studying workplace accidents “also 
made dependent wives and children central objects of concern.”113  For 
example, the New York State Employers’ Liability Commission stated the 
families of injured or killed workmen “must depend upon the work of women 
and children, or upon the assistance of relatives and friends, must reduce their 
standard of living to the detriment of health, and must often become destitute 
and dependent upon charity.”114   
Once Eastman’s book was published in 1910, support for workers’ 
compensation spread like a “prairie fire.”115  In the years after New York 
adopted the first workers’ compensation program in the United States,116 it 
became the law in jurisdiction after jurisdiction.117  Workers’ compensation, 
as its name indicates, is based on compensatory principles.  Whereas tort law 
was believed to be based on fault,118 greatly reducing the role of fault in 
workplace injuries was one of the primary attractions of workers’ 
compensation.119  The law, which was adopted as a substitute for tort, 
eliminated the requirement of proving fault on the part of the employer.120  
Instead the employee need only demonstrate the injury was work-related, 
“arising out of or in the course of employment,”121 making it much easier to 
recover.  That the purpose was compensatory—providing resources to allay 
 
 110. EASTMAN, supra note 104, at 119. 
 111. Id. at 137. 
 112. Id. 
 113. WITT, supra note 81, at 131. 
 114. N.Y. STATE EMP’S. LIAB. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF 1909 TO INQUIRE 
INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS 27 (1910) [hereinafter 
WCR]. 
 115. WITT, supra note 81, at 127. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ Compensation in the 
United States, 1900–1930, 41 J. L. & ECON. 305, 320 tbl.2 (1998). 
 118. See, e.g., WCR, supra note 114, at 10 (“The New York system of liability is, speaking 
generally, founded on fault . . . . That is the fundamental principle of our law, inherited from the 
common law of England, which no statute in this State has ever changed.”). 
 119. Christopher Howard, Workers’ Compensation, Federalism, and the Heavy Hand of History, 
16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 28, 32 (2002).  Workers’ compensation does not abandon the concept of 
responsibility.  See Gregory C. Keating, Is Tort Law “Private”?, in CIVIL WRONGS AND JUSTICE 
IN PRIVATE LAW 362 (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek, eds., 2020) (describing workers’ 
compensation as a form of “collective responsibility”). 
 120. Fishback & Kantor, supra note 117, at 309. 
 121. Id. at 305–06. 
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injuries—is underscored by the focus on easing the suffering of injured 
workers and their families.122 
Workers’ compensation allowed those injured on the job to recover 
more swift and certain compensation, but it was not one-sided.  In what 
became known as the “Grand Bargain,”123 employers and their insurers 
gained smaller, more predictable payouts.  Witt describes the bargain as “a 
kind of rough-justice in any one case, splitting the difference as between 
employers and employees.”124  Cases “would no longer get bogged down in 
litigating thorny questions of fault”125; instead, “injured employees would be 
compensated for virtually all injuries arising out of and in the course of their 
work.”126  On the other hand, “[d]amages would not be at the discretion of a 
jury or designed to make the injured employee whole, as in the law of torts, 
but would instead be scheduled at one-half or two-thirds the injured 
employees [sic] lost wages, plus medical costs.”127  In short, as befits a 
bargain, grand or otherwise, “employees, employers, and insurance carriers 
all saw the adoption of workers’ compensation as to their mutual benefit.”128  
B. Automobile Accidents 
Shortly after the states began adopting workers’ compensation statutes, 
efforts to reform automobile accidents based on compensatory principles 
were expected.129  The history of reform efforts for automobile accidents 
resembled that of workplace accidents.  Just as before, there was a surge in 
automobile accidents along with congestion in the courts.  Also as before, the 
automobile accident reform attempts were based on compensatory principles.  
The reform efforts, however, were also different in significant ways.  The 
formal reform of automobile accidents took much longer and was less 
sweeping than workers’ compensation.  More importantly, however, 
 
 122. See id. at 306 (discussing “the financial protection that workers’ compensation provided 
injured workers and their families”).  
 123. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Can State Constitutions Block the Workers’ Compensation 
Race to the Bottom?, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2017). 
 124. Id. at 1082 n.3 (quoting John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and 
American Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1186–87 (2005)). 
 125. Id. (quoting John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort 
Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1186–87 (2005)). 
 126. Id. (quoting John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort 
Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1186–87 (2005)).  
 127. Id. (quoting John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort 
Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1186–87 (2005)).  
 128. Id. at 1083. 
 129. See Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 367–
68 (1914). 
  
2021] HARMONIZING WRONGS AND COMPENSATION 361 
 
substantial alteration of the manner in which automobile accident claims 
were processed came informally. 
A dramatic increase in automobile accidents occurred between the mid-
1910s and the early 1930s.  Between 1915 and 1932, deaths due to 
automobile accidents “multiplied over seven times.”130  Moreover, in 1932, 
the “automobile fatality rate ha[d] increased more than 500% since 1913, 
while the death rate for other kinds of accidents show[ed] a decline of over 
30% for the same period.”131  Writing in 1925 in the Columbia Law Review, 
a scholar stated: 
Formerly, when horse drawn vehicles, slow in movement and few 
in number, were the principal means of transportation, there was 
comparatively little danger in the use of the streets.  But the 
increasing use and speed of automobiles have made our streets 
more dangerous than our factories and are causing a greater loss of 
life and a greater number of casualties or losses than in the World 
War.132 
In short, as automobiles became increasingly common, they created “a hellish 
carnage.”133 
Once more, the increase in accidents led to congestion in the courts.  
Automobile accidents constituted thirty percent of all new cases on the 
Supreme Court of New York County’s calendar between October 1928 and 
April 1930.134  Additionally, a study of the Courts of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia County found that automobile accident cases were half of all 
cases tried to a jury.135 
Formal tort reform of automobile accidents was slow and piecemeal.  A 
significant early effort was the 1932 “Columbia Plan,” produced by the 
Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents (“the 
Committee”), a group of academics, lawyers, and social scientists under the 
auspices of Columbia University.136  The Committee proposed compulsory 
 
 130. COLUMBIA UNIV. COUNCIL FOR RSCH. IN THE SOC. SCI., REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO 
STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL 
FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 17 (1932) [hereinafter COLUMBIA PLAN]. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Gifford, supra note77, at 110 (quoting Robert S. Marx, Compulsory Compensation 
Insurance, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 164, 167 (1925)). 
 133. Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents, Insurance, and the 
Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919 to 1941, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 521, 540 (1998) 
(“The rapid growth of motoring coupled with unimproved roads and a population with no historical 
experience driving such machines, combined to generate a hellish carnage that is difficult to 
appreciate in our era of air bags, engineered highways, and automobile conscious people.”). 
 134. COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 130, at 20. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. at 2–3. 
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automobile liability insurance paying benefits without reference to fault.137  
The Columbia Plan was explicitly based on compensation.  The Committee 
drafted an outline that provided: “[T]he main purpose of [the] compensation 
plan is to spread through insurance the inevitable losses due to automobile 
accidents.”138  Similar to Eastman’s focus on the wounded family in Work-
Accidents and the Law, the Columbia Plan covered the plight of accident 
victims’ families and included numerous individual “case studies” that 
humanized the effect of automobile accidents.139  The Columbia Plan did not 
garner enough political support to be enacted in any jurisdiction; automobile 
accident reforms were placed on the backburner as the Great Depression and 
World War II consumed national attention.140   
Scholars continued to focus on automobile accident reform, and a 
breakthrough occurred in 1965 when Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O’Connell 
published Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim: A Blueprint for Reforming 
Automobile Insurance.141  Keeton and O’Connell noted the continued surge 
in automobile accidents: “In 1963 the death toll reached a new high of 43,600, 
which was in turn eclipsed by a figure of about 47,000 to 48,000 in 1964.”142  
Furthermore, these accidents continued to cause court congestion that was 
described by Keeton and O’Connell as “crushing.”143  The authors proposed 
that states adopt no-fault automobile laws in which mandatory first-party 
insurance would cover economic loss caused by personal injuries.144  In 
essence, up until a certain monetary threshold—perhaps $10,000—a driver’s 
own insurer would pay the driver for economic loss from personal injuries 
suffered in automobile accidents, without reference to fault.145  Tort liability 
was reserved for larger cases—those above the threshold—but the recovery 
would be reduced by the amount already provided through first-party 
 
 137. ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC 
VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 138 (1965). 
 138. Young B. Smith, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUM. L. 
REV. 785, 799 (1932).  Deterrence was disclaimed: “The problem of compensation for injuries 
caused by such accidents rather than the problem of accident prevention has been the Committee’s 
field of study.”  COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 130, at 1 (footnote omitted).  The Committee also 
questioned the principle of fault: “The Committee believes that the principle of liability for fault 
only is a principle of social expediency, and that it is not founded on any immutable basis of right.”  
Id. at 212.   
 139. COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 130, at 4, 223–35. 
 140. Joseph A. Page, Roscoe Pound, Melvin Belli, and the Personal-Injury Bar: The Tale of an 
Odd Coupling, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 637, 668 (2009). 
 141. KEETON & O’CONNELL, supra note 137. 
 142. Id. at 11 (footnote omitted). 
 143. Id. at 13. 
 144. Id. at 7, 9. 
 145. See id. at 7. 
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insurance.146  The idea was to efficiently resolve smaller cases, leaving the 
resources of the court system available to process more significant cases. 
No-fault insurance was based on compensatory principles.147  Keeton & 
O’Connell concluded that neither fault nor deterrence was an entirely 
sufficient reason to shift losses.148  Instead, they argued that “the burden of a 
minimum level of protection against measurable economic loss” should be 
“treated as a cost of motoring.”149  Specifically, they contended that “[t]he 
cost of providing this minimum level of compensation for traffic victims 
would be distributed generally among the persons who benefit from 
motoring, without regard to fault in particular accidents.”150  In the 1970s, 
sixteen states adopted some version of no-fault automobile law.151  
Thus, automobile accident tort reform, as a formal matter, was delayed 
and unsystematic.  Informally, however, there was a substantial reform of the 
way in which automobile accident claims were processed.  The informal 
reform—routinization of the claims process—was also a product of the surge 
in automobile accidents, was compensatory in nature, and can be traced 
primarily to liability insurance.152 
The surge of automobile accidents and the need to compensate victims 
led to reform of insurance laws.  In January 1927, new automobile insurance 
mandates went into effect in Massachusetts and Connecticut.  Massachusetts 
adopted a compulsory automobile insurance law, meaning it is illegal to 
operate a vehicle without an insurance policy in effect.153  On the other hand, 
Connecticut adopted a financial responsibility law.154  Unlike a compulsory 
law, a financial responsibility law generally did not require purchasing 
insurance until after an accident.155  Once an accident occurred, the driver 
was required to prove the ability to pay future damages,156 typically 
demonstrated by purchasing insurance.  The potential inability to pay 
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damages for the initial accident was a weakness of financial responsibility 
laws, and compulsory laws became the dominant approach to automobile 
insurance.  Today, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted compulsory automobile insurance laws.157  As noted by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts: “The purpose of the compulsory motor 
vehicle insurance law is not, like ordinary insurance, to protect the owner or 
operator alone from loss, but rather is to provide compensation to persons 
injured through the operation of the automobile insured by the owner.”158 
By the time of the Columbia Plan in 1932,159 it was already obvious that 
liability insurance for automobile accidents dramatically liberalized recovery 
of compensation.  The Committee reviewed 2,500 closed cases of temporary 
disability involving insured defendants and 900 cases involving uninsured 
defendants.160  Claimants received payment in 86% of the insured cases, but 
only 27% of the uninsured cases.161  In cases of permanent disability, 
claimants received payment in 96% of the 192 closed cases with insured 
defendants, but only 21% of the 90 cases with uninsured defendants.162  The 
Committee opined, “[I]nsurance companies pay in so large a proportion of 
the cases in which liability insurance is carried, that the principle of liability 
without fault seems almost to be recognized.”163 
Regarding automobile accident claims, compensation was not simply 
conditioned on the fault of the tortfeasor and the lack of fault by the victim; 
instead “the theory of full compensation or none yields to the practice of 
partial compensation in almost every one of the multitude of settlements.”164  
Keeton & O’Connell attributed this to settlement practices: Because of the 
large number of insureds, insurers take a collective view of risk, appraising 
claims “impersonally by standards appropriate to the management of a large 
pool of risks.”165  An individual claim will settle “whenever this can be done 
for a sum representing an appropriate discount from the probable amount of 
an award if the case should be tried and lost.  This discount is tailored to the 
degree of likelihood that the insurer would win if the claim were litigated.”166  
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Insurers will pay money to some cases it could have won at trial, but will 
make that up in other cases by settling for less than it would have lost at trial.  
“The insurer’s major concern is the most economical allocation of available 
funds to all the claims in the risk pool.”167 
Laurence Ross shed light on the role of insurance adjusters in the claims 
process in his major empirical study of claims practices, chronicled in Settled 
Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustments.168  Ross’s 
study supported the assertions in the Columbia Plan and by Keeton & 
O’Connell that the fault standard was not strictly applied in automobile 
accident cases.  Based on formal law, which included the absolute bar of 
contributory negligence in most jurisdictions at the time, “a literal application 
of these rules would result in very few recoveries.”169  But the files Ross 
reviewed told a different story: In the “large majority of cases . . . a claimant 
who has provable economic loss will recover something.”170  Additionally, 
complete denials of compensation were “very largely confined to trivial 
losses.”171 
Ross attributed these results to insurance and the role of adjusters.  He 
concluded that adjusters were pressured to close cases promptly, and that the 
easiest way to do so was to pay claimants.172  Ross also found that adjusters 
understood liability in mechanical, not moral, terms.173  Using bright-line 
traffic laws instead of the complex “reasonable person” standard,174 adjusters 
put cases into broad categories such as “rear-enders, red-light cases, stop sign 
cases, and the like.”175  In terms of damages, most cases are simply valued by 
some multiple of medical bills.176  Ross believed that payment followed 
liability and damages, as interpreted by the insurer.177  The limitations, 
however, were very loose, particularly regarding liability: “As liability 
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becomes more questionable, the claim becomes ‘worth’ less in the adjuster’s 
eyes.  When there are strong doubts as to the insured’s negligence, 
or . . . evidence of contributory negligence[,] . . . the adjuster will define the 
claims as one ‘for compromise.’”178  Even under these circumstances, “the 
adjuster is reluctant to pay less than medical bills.”179  Importantly, Ross also 
found that some payment is made in most cases with high damages, without 
regard to the facts on liability.180  Although formal law becomes more 
important as the size of the claim increases, Ross found evidence of 
routinization even in larger cases.  Ross concluded, “even a highly 
individualistic law, when required to handle masses of cases, becomes 
categorical.”181   
Routinization was aided by the rise of repeat players on the plaintiffs’ 
side.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers in the early twentieth century did not generally 
approach automobile accidents in a coordinated, systematic manner.182  
Samuel Issacharoff and John Witt chronicled these changes, which began in 
1946 when a group of workers’ compensation claimants’ lawyers formed the 
National Association of Claimants’ Compensation Attorneys (“NACCA”).183  
In a few years, NACCA began to focus on tort cases, including automobile 
accidents.  Group members shared information on trial and settlement 
practices, helping them overcome the informational advantages insurers had 
long held.184  In addition to the sharing of information, referral networks were 
created, leading to specialization for plaintiffs’ lawyers.185  As a result, 
generalists handled automobile accidents less often.186   
Having specialists on both sides of cases brought advantages.  The 
“presence of bargaining agents who knew the short-cuts, the heuristics, and 
the rules-of-thumb often made the settlement process considerably more 
efficient.”187  Sometimes adjusters and plaintiffs’ lawyers would swap cases, 
meaning if one case was settled at 50%, then another would be as well.188 
They also often created “package-deals” in which a number of cases were 
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settled at a time.189  The efficiency created by routinization meant that by the 
mid-1960s automobile accident claims were being settled much faster than 
other tort claims.190  Because automobile accident claims provided efficient 
compensation to many more victims than formal doctrine would have 
allowed, Issacharoff & Witt compared automobile accident claims to 
workers’ compensation claims.  They stated: “The striking feature is the 
similarity of the mature tort injury system in auto claims to the administrative 
system of workmen’s compensation.”191 
Routinization on the plaintiffs’ side has taken one further step, as 
described by Nora Engstrom.  In the course of the last several decades, 
settlement mills have developed as a new business model for plaintiffs’ 
personal injury firms.192  According to Engstrom, settlement mills are “high-
volume personal injury law practices that aggressively advertise and mass 
produce the resolution of claims, typically with little client interaction and 
without initiating lawsuits, much less taking claims to trial.”193  Claims 
arising from automobile accidents are the hallmark claims of settlement 
mills.194  For settlement mills, “[e]fficiency trumps process and quality.”195  
Mills typically accept almost any case; Engstrom interviewed one mill 
employee who stated that the “modus operandi was to sign everything up.”196  
Despite this lack of quality control, cases in which an insurer makes no offer 
are very rare.197  Although ostensibly operating pursuant to formal law, 
settlement mills function more like no-fault insurance, providing “fairly 
certain and standardized sums at relatively low systemic cost.”198  In doing 
so, the informal routinization of automobile claims accomplished what 
formal tort reform could not. 
As with workers’ compensation, however, not all of the benefits flow to 
plaintiffs, defendants and insurers benefit, as well.  Defendants’ liability 
payments are more predictable, and transaction costs, such as time and 
attorneys’ fees, are reduced.  Insurers receive what they perhaps want the 
most—predictability—and smaller payments in a lot of cases.  In many ways, 
the informal reform of automobile accident claims reached the same 
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outcomes as the formal reform of workplace accident claims.  In both 
instances, surges of tort claims led to a compensatory reformulation of the 
law that provides some benefits to all the parties involved. 
C. Mass Disasters 
Over the last two decades, in response to certain tragedies, both 
legislatures and private corporations have set up funds to compensate victims 
of specific mass disasters.199  These mass disasters, and the funds created in 
their wakes, follow the pattern.  A surge of injuries highlights the limitations 
of resolving claims through tort law; a compensatory work-around is created 
that has benefits for claimants and potential defendants.  The fact that fault 
and responsibility are essentially the same with respect to each victim makes 
case-by-case negligence liability particularly unattractive.  As Robert Rabin 
notes, “What all of this adds up to is compensation as a focal point in a new 
guise.”200  I discuss three examples: (1) the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund, (2) the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust, and (3) the 
General Motors (“GM”) Ignition Switch Fund. 
1. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 
On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered the worst terrorist 
attack in its history when Al Qaeda hijackers flew airplanes into the World 
Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Virginia, and—thanks to 
heroic passengers—a field in Pennsylvania.201  Within days, Congress 
created the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.202  The Fund’s dual 
purpose was to compensate the victims of the tragic attack and to protect 
airlines from crippling tort liability.203  The gist of the Fund was that 
claimants would receive no-fault compensation from the federal government 
in exchange for relinquishing the right to sue in tort anyone other than the 
hijackers and their accomplices.204 
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The rules and procedures of the Fund were to be promulgated and 
administered by a “Special Master,” who was appointed by the Attorney 
General of the United States.205  Kenneth Feinberg was appointed Special 
Master in November 2001.206  Each claimant was required to fill out a form 
providing: (1) claimant’s physical harm suffered or, if filing on behalf of a 
decedent, proof of death; (2) economic and noneconomic losses suffered; and 
(3) any collateral sources, such as life insurance, received or pending.207  The 
Special Master was required to review the claim and make a determination 
within 120 days of the filing of the claim.208  The claimant need only prove 
they were: (1) present at the scene of the crash sites at the time or in the 
immediate aftermath of the attacks and suffered physical injuries or death, 
(2) a member of the flight crew or passenger on one of the flights, or (3) a 
representative thereof.209  Economic loss specific to lost wages was 
determined by “a ‘presumed economic loss’ schedule based on age, size of 
family, and recent past earnings.”210  Under the schedule, however, a claimant 
received no credit for annual gross income over $200,000.211  Noneconomic 
loss for an eligible death was limited to “$250,000 plus an additional 
$100,000 for the spouse and each dependent of the deceased victim.”212  
Punitive damages were not available.213  Payment from the Fund was required 
within twenty days of the Special Master’s determination,214 and was not 
subject to judicial review.215 
The Fund differed from tort liability in several ways.  First, neither fault 
nor causation needed to be proved.  Relatedly, delay and transaction costs 
were dramatically reduced.  Under the Fund, a claimant would have 
compensation within 140 days of filing a claim.216  Attorneys and experts 
were not required for the process, and many lawyers offered pro bono 
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services, so transaction costs were limited.217  On the other hand, damages 
were also limited: There were, effectively, caps on both economic and 
noneconomic loss, and punitive damages were unavailable.218  Moreover, 
collateral sources were subtracted from awards provided by the Fund.  In 
general, those who sued recovered more than twice the average recovery of 
the Fund.219  In a highly unusual alteration, the federal government provided 
the money for the awards made by the Fund instead of the airlines.220  Among 
other things, due to the taxing power of the federal government, this virtually 
eliminated the possibility of non-payment due to insufficient funds.   
The benefits to each side are clear: Claimants received no-fault payment 
very quickly with minimal transaction costs.  The airline defendants received 
protection from tort liability beyond the amount of their insurance, and an 
opportunity to avoid years of acrimonious litigation.  The federal government 
symbolically stood behind the sympathetic victims of a horrendous terror 
attack and protected the very useful airlines serving its citizens from 
bankruptcy.  Special Master Feinberg emphasized that “the pathway of tort 
was littered with obstacles.”221  His administration of the Fund was “aimed 
at encouraging victims to forego the uncertainties and delays associated with 
tort in favor of immediate recourse to no-fault compensation for cabined 
recovery of out-of-pocket and intangible loss.”222  Ultimately, 97% of eligible 
claimants waived tort liability in exchange for an award from the Fund.223 
2.  BP Oil Spill Fund/Gulf Coast Claims Facility 
On April 20, 2010, the petroleum company BP created a catastrophic oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico.224  Several months later, BP formed a 
compensation fund in response to pressure from President Barack Obama that 
claimants be fairly paid from a fund independent of BP.225  Under the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”),226 BP was designated the responsible party 
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for the spill and was to be held strictly liable for losses, which included 
“removal costs, natural resource damages, personal property damages and 
attendant economic loss, loss of profits resulting from destruction of real or 
personal property or natural resources, and lost taxes and fees.”227  OPA caps 
the responsible party’s liability at $75 million plus cleanup costs, unless 
negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of applicable regulations is 
proved.228  Claims are made to the responsible party, and, if not denied or 
settled in ninety days, the victim may sue.229   
The fund was to be stocked with $20 billion provided by BP and sought 
“releases from claimants of litigation against BP.”230  Gulf Coast Claims 
Facility (“GCCF”) was the entity created to distribute the $20 billion BP 
fund.231  GCCF sought to pay not only OPA claims, but “state-tort claims for 
physical injury and death” as well.232  Kenneth Feinberg was named the 
GCCF Claims Administrator.233  Eligibility was dependent upon a 
combination of loss location and business type.234  
Claimants were divided into four groups.235  Group 1 was composed of 
claimants that were “heavily dependent on Gulf resources and tourism and 
were located in zip codes that bordered the Gulf shore.”236  They could 
recover even if evidence linking the claimant’s loss to the oil spill was not 
submitted.237  Group 2 consisted of “individuals and businesses that were 
located in the Gulf Alliance counties, but were not in zip codes that bordered 
the Gulf shore, as well as businesses that, while located in zip codes that 
bordered the Gulf shore, were not heavily reliant on Gulf resources and 
tourism.”238   
To determine eligibility, claimants in Group 2 were first subjected to a 
“Financial Test,” comparing their post-spill income in 2010 to other recent 
periods.239  Even if the claimant failed the Financial Test by not establishing 
a sufficient post-spill decline, eligibility could be established by providing a 
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“specific causation document” linking a claimant’s losses to the spill, such 
as a canceled contract.240  Claimants in Group 3 “either were not located on 
the Gulf shore or Gulf Alliance counties, or were businesses or the employees 
of businesses that were not heavily reliant on Gulf resources and tourism.”241  
Eligibility for compensation required claimants in Group 3 to pass both the 
Financial Test and provide a specific causation document.242  “Group 4 
consisted of claimants in business types that were deemed ineligible for 
compensation at various times by the GCCF.”243 
In terms of time, distribution of the funds was divided into phases.244  In 
Phase I, the first six months after the oil spill, payments were made based on 
lesser documentation than would be required later.245  The goal was to make 
these emergency payments “as quickly as possible” to stabilize struggling 
claimants.246  Claimants did not waive their right to sue by accepting 
emergency payments, but final settlements were reduced accordingly.247  In 
Phase II, claimants were allowed to choose among a quick payment, an 
interim payment, and a final payment.248  A quick payment, $5,000 to an 
individual or $25,000 to a business, was available to claimants that had taken 
an emergency payment or an interim payment from the GCCF, and was 
available without providing additional documentation.249  It required 
claimants to release their right to seek further compensation in relation to the 
spill.250  Interim payments compensated claimants for “all past documented 
damage” due to the spill and allowed claimants to make further claims against 
the fund once each quarter to seek additional compensation.251  Claimants 
were required to provide documentation, but were not required to provide a 
release.252  Final payments compensated claimants for “all documented past 
damage plus estimated future damage” caused by the spill; claimants were 
required to release their right to any further compensation in relation to the 
spill.253   
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GCCF determinations regarding the payment of interim and final 
payments were to be made within ninety days of being presented.254  Payment 
to the claimant had to be made within fourteen days of receipt of the signed 
release.255  As with the 9/11 Fund, damages were restricted.256  GCCF did not 
make any payments for alleged punitive damages.257  GCCF also “deduct[ed] 
and offset prior payments by BP or other sources,” such as insurance, “from 
the final settlement amounts.”258 
The BP fund differed from tort liability in several ways.  Claimants were 
not required to prove fault due to the OPA’s strict liability standard.259  
Partially because of strict liability, and partially because the goal of the fund 
was to counteract an economic threat by providing money quickly, delay and 
transaction costs were reduced.260  Emergency payments were available 
within the first six months of the oil spill.261  In Phase II, GCCF protocols 
required making decisions on interim and final payments within ninety days 
of receiving them, and actually paying the claims within fourteen days of 
receiving a signed release.262  Transaction costs were reduced; only three 
percent of claimants hired a lawyer.263  On the other hand, damages were 
limited.  Collateral sources were deducted from settlement amounts and 
“capped” in the sense that all payments had to be made from the available 
funds.  Punitive damages were not available.264   
Again, the benefits to claimants and BP are clear.  Claimants received 
swift compensation, in many cases, when it was urgently needed, with low 
transaction costs.  Moreover, the placement of funds in the hands of GCCF 
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removed the fear of BP’s insolvency due to a flood of claims.  BP was able 
to protect itself from a large number of claims with relatively circumscribed 
awards.  BP benefited when claimants elected the fund because there was a 
real possibility that damage awards from lawsuits would be extremely high 
because of the tragedy and possible jury mindsets.265  In processing more than 
one million claims, GCCF paid out $6.2 billion to over 220,000 claimants in 
its year and a half of operation; 97% of payments were made to claimants in 
the Gulf states.266 
3. GM Ignition Switch Fund 
Compared to the other two funds, the GM Ignition Switch Fund was 
simple.  It did not involve legislation or the government; it was a business 
directly compensating victims of wrongdoing in exchange for releases of 
claims.267  In 2014, after delaying action for several years,268 GM issued a 
recall on 2.6 million small cars due to a faulty ignition switch.269  While a car 
was being driven, the ignition switch could slip out of the run position; the 
car would stall, and the power steering, power brakes, and air bags would be 
disabled.270  The faulty ignition switch resulted in at least 169 deaths, and 124 
wrongful death cases.271 
By March 2014, GM retained Kenneth Feinberg as a consultant to 
explore options for compensating the victims.272  He was given “sole 
discretion” in deciding both the eligibility and the amount a victim would 
receive.273  GM agreed to honor Feinberg’s decisions: “No appeals.  No 
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rejection.  It must pay it.”274  Feinberg required that claimants provide 
evidence, even if circumstantial, that the faulty ignition switch caused their 
injuries.275  He further determined that victims would not be excluded from 
the fund based on contributory negligence.276  GM did not “cap” the fund; 
there was no limit on the aggregate amount of money that GM would pay 
under the fund.277 
In awarding damages, Feinberg used a formula that relied on national 
averages for settlement values of economic and noneconomic losses.278  In 
death cases, economic losses were based on the victim’s age, salary, 
historical earnings and dependents; noneconomic payouts were $1 million 
for the deceased and “$300,000 each for the surviving spouse and any 
dependents.”279  National averages were used in cases of living victims as 
well.280  For example, victims who spent between eight and fifteen days in a 
hospital would be paid $170,000.281  Victims were allowed to choose a 
standard amount based on averages or request an individualized calculation 
based on “extraordinary circumstances.”282  Simple cases were paid in ninety 
days, while more complex cases were paid in 180 days.283 
The fund was different than tort law in several important ways.  First, 
proving fault was not required and contributory negligence was irrelevant; 
proof of causation was sufficient.  Partially because of this, delay and 
transaction costs were reduced.  Eligible claims were paid in 90 or 180 days.  
On the other hand, compensation was typically based on an average 
settlement figure, generally less than would be potentially available in tort.  
Punitive damages were not available.284   
The fund provided benefits to both sides.  Claimants recovered 
reasonable compensation swiftly with low transaction costs.  GM resolved 
claims more efficiently than through the tort system and avoided blockbuster 
verdicts.  GM further earned the good will of admitting error and 
compensating for it.  Over the course of the fund, Feinberg paid out $594.5 
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million in order to settle 399 claims.285  Claimants receiving settlement offers 
through the fund accepted them over 90% of the time.286 
Funds are proliferating as a way to resolve a large number of tort claims.  
Linda Mullenix states: “The twenty-first century may very well mark both 
the advent and triumph of fund approaches to resolving mass tort 
litigation.”287  It is important to note, however, that these funds and the 
concept of funds generally have been criticized extensively.  As indicated, 
Kenneth Feinberg administered all of the funds in this section.  He has been 
accused of being too close to the sponsors of the funds,288 as well as 
questioned about the amount and process of his compensation.289  The funds 
have been accused of being insufficiently transparent,290 and failing to meet 
the requirements of procedural justice.291  Perhaps most significantly, given 
the importance of choice on the part of the claimants, funds have been 
criticized on the grounds of lack of informed consent.292   
My limited purpose in this Article is not to endorse any particular fund, 
or even the general concept of funds.  Instead, it is to demonstrate that a 
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substantial number of claimants are attracted to the compromise of more 
swift and certain compensation, even if it means less of it.  As noted, 97% of 
potential plaintiffs chose to use the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund293 and 
over 90% of potential plaintiffs receiving an offer from the GM fund accepted 
it.294  Those percentages are overwhelming, even if one accepts for the 
purposes of argument imperfections in the informed consent process.295  
The details of the foregoing discussion can be distracting, but for our 
purposes, there are a few salient points.  Tort history reveals that 
compensation has been important for a portion of claimants in the tort system 
for well over a century, even during more admonitory phases of tort law.  
Compensatory preferences have resulted in workers’ compensation, no-fault 
auto laws and routinized auto claims, and various compensation funds.  
Plaintiffs motivated by compensation are the norm, not the exception.  
Attempting to accommodate their preferences is better than dismissing them.  
Moreover, surges in accidents tend to heighten the need for compensation 
and make it more possible due to the ability to routinize claims.  Finally, there 
is a pattern to the compensatory solutions created to resolve accident surges: 
A compromise is enacted in which plaintiffs receive funds more certainly and 
swiftly, but in lesser amounts. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, there is a percentage of plaintiffs, likely substantial, for 
whom compensation—the replacement of lost funds—is the primary 
motivating factor in filing a tort claim.  The open-textured nature of most tort 
cases, which may assist in an individualized justice procedure attempting to 
vindicate rights, is ill-suited to compensation.  Such uncertainty is slow and 
costly.  Tort history reveals that a portion of plaintiffs have been motivated 
by compensation for well over a century, and that becomes most apparent in 
surges of accidents.  Tort law is often beset by such surges; they are a blessing 
and a curse.  Waves of injuries involve pain and need, but they also focus 
attention on a problem and invite solutions.  Moreover, the sheer number of 
injuries means that their resolution can be routinized.  Although routinization 
has occurred in different ways, a pattern of compromise benefiting both 
parties has emerged.  Compensation for injuries becomes swifter and more 
certain, but in lesser amounts.   
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A pressure-release valve, designed to remove compensation-oriented 
cases from wrongs-based tort law, would benefit the plaintiffs and defendants 
in those tort cases, as well as reserve the tort system for those interested in 
righting wrongs.  Following the pattern of the Grand Bargain and the 
structure of the more modern settlement funds, such compensatory cases 
should be resolved much more swiftly and certainly than cases in the 
traditional tort system, but with reduced damages.   
The solutions seen in the prior section—workers’ compensation, 
routinized automobile accident claims procedures, and compensation 
funds—have many positive attributes, but also limitations.  Workers’ 
compensation is both under- and over-inclusive.  It is only available for 
workplace accidents, leaving all other injuries to the challenges of the tort 
system.  On the other hand, it almost completely replaces tort law for injuries 
in the workplace.  If the parties want a wrongs-based, individualized justice 
ruling, it is not available to them.  The routinization of the automobile 
accident claims process has similar problems: It is only available for those 
injured in automobile accidents.  On the other hand, routinized claims 
procedures are not necessarily best for all automobile accident victims.  In 
particular, clients accepting the services of settlement mills, which have 
ethical issues,296 are often unaware of the type of representation they are 
selecting.297  Especially in the case of serious injuries, the failure to 
understand the limited quality of settlement mills can be costly.298  Finally, 
mass disaster compensation funds only compensate those injured in very 
specific circumstances.  Moreover, to be legitimate, such funds must be 
transparent and include fair procedures, most importantly assuring informed 
consent on the part of those choosing the fund compensation.   
Most of tort law is not properly designed to meet the compensatory 
goals of a large number of claimants.  What is needed is a way to bypass tort 
law in cases better suited for compensation, while leaving wrongs-
adjudication in place as the default.299  Designing such a bypass is 
challenging, but worth the effort.  If successful, it would incorporate 
compensation into wrongs-based tort law, smoothing the vacillation Ted 
White describes between admonitory and compensatory phases in tort.300  
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Additionally, the search for a way to fairly compensate those claimants who 
are not seeking vindication may create common ground on tort reform.  A 
simpler, cheaper procedure with decreased pain and suffering damages would 
be fairer than some current reforms, like caps on damages, yet potentially 
generate the savings desired by business interests. 
